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POSITIVE TRAIN CONTROL (PTC): 
CALCULATING BENEFITS AND COSTS OF A 
NEW RAILROAD CONTROL TECHNOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this analysis is to quantify the 
business benefits of Positive Train Control 
(PTC) for the Class I freight railroad industry.1
Positive Train Control can include many 
different capabilities, covering a range of railroad 
functions.  Through use of a digital data link 
and real-time train location information, PTC 
can be a train control system, with the digital 
data link and the on-board computer (OBC) 
used for issuance and enforcement of movement 
authorities.2   The data link may also be used to 
transmit work instructions to train crews, receive 
acknowledgment of completed work, or transmit 
locomotive diagnostic information in real time. 
The safety benefi ts of PTC were previously 
quantified by the Rail Safety Advisory 
Committee (RSAC),3 which identifi ed nearly a 
thousand “PPAs” (PTC-preventable accidents) 
The purpose of this analysis was to quantify the business benefi ts of Positive Train Control (PTC)
for the Class I freight railroad industry.  This report does not address the safety benefi ts of PTC. 
These were previously quantifi ed by the Rail Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC), which identifi ed 
nearly a thousand “PPAs” (PTC-preventable accidents) on U.S. railroads over a 12-year period, 
and determined the savings to be realized from each avoided accident.  The RSAC fi nding was that 
avoidance of these PPAs was not, by itself, suffi cient (from a strictly economic point of view) to justify 
an investment in PTC.
Examples of potential business benefi ts include:
• Line capacity enhancement
• Improved service reliability
• Faster over-the-road running times
• More efficient use of cars and locomotives (made possible by real-time location 
information)
• Reduction in locomotive failures (due to availability of real-time diagnostics)
• Larger “windows” (periods during which no trains operate and maintenance workers 
can safely occupy the track) for track maintenance (made possible by real-time location 
information)
• Fuel savings
This paper presents the results of the analysis.  It is important to recognize, however, that the 
state of the art in making these estimates is not suffi ciently mature to make exact answers feasible. 
Presented here are the best estimates now possible, with observations as to how better information 
may be developed.  Benefi ts were estimated in the above areas and the cost of deploying PTC on the 
Class I network (99,000 route miles and 20,000 locomotives) were calculated. The conclusions of 
the analysis were as follows:
• Deployment of PTC on the Class I railroad network (99,000 route miles, 20,000 locomotives) 
would cost between $2.3 billion and $4.4 billion over fi ve years
• Annual benefi ts, once the system was fully implemented, were estimated at $2.2 billion to 
$3.8 billion
• Internal rate of return was estimated (depending on timing and cost) to be between 44% 
and 160%
by Randolph R. Resor, Michael E. Smith and Pradeep K. Patel
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on U.S. railroads during a 12-year period, and 
determined the savings to be realized from each 
avoided accident.  The RSAC fi nding was that 
avoidance of these PPAs was not, by itself, 
suffi cient (from a strictly economic point of 
view) to justify an investment in PTC.
The Congress of the United States then 
directed the Federal Railroad Administration 
(FRA) to conduct a separate evaluation of 
the business benefi ts of PTC.  These are the 
savings railroads (and shippers) might expect 
to see if PTC is deployed on the U.S. railroad 
network.  Examples of potential business benefi ts 
include:
• Line capacity enhancement
• Improved service reliability
• Faster over-the-road running times
• More effi cient use of cars and locomotives 
(made possible by real-time location 
information)
• Reduction in locomotive failures (due to 
availability of real-time diagnostics)
• Larger “windows” (periods during which 
no trains operate and maintenance workers 
can safely occupy the track) for track 
maintenance (made possible by real-time 
location information)
• Fuel savings
This paper describes the estimation of these 
business benefi ts.
Defi nition of Positive Train Control
Any PTC installation will consist of three distinct 
segments:
• The vehicle segment: on-board computer 
(OBC), location system, digital data link
• The wayside segment: wayside interface 
units for defect detectors, signals, and track 
switches; radio towers
• The central offi ce segment: central comput-
ers, dispatcher interface
This analysis quantifies benefits for a 
stand-alone “vital”4 system, which includes 
OBC, digital data link, and a central safety 
system.  The PTC system evaluated here is 
based on the North American Joint PTC project 
in Illinois, which supplements differential GPS5
with accelerometers and a gyroscope that give 
locomotives the ability to resolve location down to 
a particular track.  This location accuracy enables 
PTC to support “moving block” operation, in 
which the distance between following trains is 
reduced to that required to stop the following 
train short of a rear-end collision.6
QUANTIFICATION OF BENEFITS
The benefi ts of PTC are realized in a number 
of ways.  Line capacity and service reliability 
are improved by the availability of accurate, 
real time data on train location and speed. 
This enables train dispatchers to respond more 
quickly to service disruptions, and to more 
quickly formulate alternative dispatching plans 
as circumstances change.
Moving block (or dynamic block) permits 
trains to follow more closely, increasing line 
capacity.  Faster over-the-road running times 
result from better “meets”7 between trains (since 
dispatchers know train position more accurately 
and trains can follow more closely).
PTC also provides the capability to issue 
instructions (work orders) to train crews in real 
time. These instructions direct crews to deliver or 
pick up freight cars. PTC also permits the crews 
to report the completion of this work in real time. 
This permits more effective management of rail 
equipment.
The digital data link in PTC can be used 
to report diagnostic data on locomotives in 
real time, allowing shop personnel to diagnose 
malfunctions and order necessary parts before a 
locomotive arrives in the shop.  Diagnostics also 
should provide warning of impending failures, 
possibly allowing train crews to take actions that 
avoid an en-route failure that delays trains.
Real-time data on train location and speed 
also will allow track maintenance forces (track 
inspectors and others) to more effectively utilize 
their time. Traffi c density on the U.S. rail network 
has increased signifi cantly since deregulation of 
the industry in 1980 (Association of American 
Railroads, 2004).  This has made the scheduling 
of track time for inspection and maintenance 
more and more diffi cult.  Real-time, accurate 
information on train location should permit 
an increase in the productivity of track forces, 
although this benefi t is not quantifi ed here.
Finally, real-time position information will 
allow train dispatchers to pace trains between 
scheduled meet points, permitting fuel savings. 
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Current practice is to run trains at maximum 
authorized speeds, often arriving at meet 
points well ahead of schedule.  With real-time 
information on the location of opposing trains, 
it may be possible to slow a train down to save 
fuel.
Note that some of these benefi ts might be 
obtained by other means.  For example, some 
railroads are now using handheld wireless 
devices for work order reporting.  Use of 
computer tools to develop more efficient 
operating plans might produce increases in 
equipment utilization similar to those achievable 
with PTC.  Some improvements in locomotive 
performance have already been obtained by use 
of on-board diagnostics.  One Class I railroad is 
experimenting with an on-board computer that 
attempts to minimize fuel consumption subject 
to various schedule constraints.
The largest benefi t categories are:
• A reduction in equipment ownership cost, 
because of an estimated 5% to 10% increase 
in car velocity
• The avoidance of a large investment 
railroads would otherwise have to make 
to increase capacity on an estimated 
8,300 route miles of railroad (about 8% 
of the network) currently operating at or 
above design capacity.  Here, the cost of 
constructing the 8,300 miles of track has 
been annualized over a presumed 80 year 
life at a discount rate of 7%; to this cost has 
been added an annual cost to maintain 8,000 
additional miles of mainline track.
• Significant benefits to shippers from a 
presumed improvement in service quality
Other benefi ts are relatively much smaller.
Expected costs of PTC have also been 
quantifi ed.  Available information from railroads 
and suppliers has been used to estimate the costs 
of the three segments of PTC.  Of these, the cost 
of the central dispatch offi ce is the least certain. 
In earlier analyses for Canadian National 
Railways and Burlington Northern Railroad, 
the cost of the central offi ce equipment was 
estimated to be about the same as that of the 
wayside and vehicle components of the system. 
However, in this analysis, central offi ce cost 
is estimated to be a relatively smaller part of 
the total, for two reasons.  First, in the past 
decade most of the Class I railroads have built 
consolidated dispatching centers, and will most 
likely put PTC equipment in these existing 
buildings (previous studies assumed the need 
to build new dispatching centers).  Second, 
control offi ce software is now being developed 
at test installations on railroads.  By the time 
any decision is made to install PTC nationwide, 
the necessary software should already have been 
developed.  It will only require customization 
for each railroad installation.  But because of the 
uncertainty over central offi ce cost, a very large 
range has been used. 
Most of the benefits identified here are 
savings to the railroads from more efficient 
operation.  In the case of line capacity, the 
annual amounts shown are an annualization of 
the capital cost of 8,300 miles of second main 
track, plus the annual cost of maintaining that 
track.  Car and locomotive savings are similarly 
calculated.  In each case, an annual ownership 
cost is calculated using a purchase price, an 
expected service life, and a cost of money.
It is important to note that it is by no means 
certain that railroads will realize all of the 
benefi ts estimated here.  Railroads might choose 
to give some of the savings to their customers 
in the form of lower rail rates.  Historically, 
80% of the savings railroads have realized 
since deregulation have been given to shippers 
(Martland, 1998).  But whether the benefi ts flow 
to railroads or to their customers, in one way or 
another the entire U.S. economy benefi ts.
SPECIFIC AREAS OF BENEFIT
Line Capacity
Real-time location information allows railroads 
to operate with dynamic, rather than fi xed-length 
blocks between trains.  Functionally, dynamic 
headways8 in PTC work as follows:
• The OBC on each train continuously 
calculates a minimum safe stopping 
distance
• Using this distance, the central safety system 
can calculate a minimum safe distance 
between opposing and following trains
• This minimum distance is constantly recal-




Dynamic headways can potentially increase 
line capacity by permitting shorter and lighter 
trains to operate on closer headways, rather 
than constraining all trains to the separation 
required by the longest and heaviest trains.  The 
potential savings due to avoided investment in 
additional track and right-of-way (ROW) has 
been quantifi ed here.  Dynamic headways can 
also, in conjunction with a local tactical planner, 
reduce average running times.  For instance, a 
20% reduction in run time means that a train that 
used to take fi ve hours for a trip will now take 
four hours.  This provides an extra hour when the 
track is free to run another train.  Any reduction 
in run time produces an equal increase in track 
availability.  
The amount of capacity expansion which 
might be needed, and hence the total cost of ca-
pacity expansion, depend on a number of factors 
which are diffi cult to estimate.  Line capacity is 
determined by a number of location- and route-
specifi c factors, including grades and curvature, 
operating speeds, type of signal control, and traf-
fi c mix.  The specifi c actions that must be taken 
to resolve capacity bottlenecks will also differ 
from location to location.
In this analysis, an attempt has been made to 
determine the route mileage of the Class I rail-
road network that is now operating at or above 
capacity.  This mileage has, in turn, been used to 
estimate the cost of needed capacity additions, a 
cost that may be avoided by PTC installation. 
Lines Currently at Capacity. The Volpe Rail 
Network (VRN) contains data on annual traffi c 
volume in millions of gross tons (MGT), type 
of signal control, number of trains per day, and 
number of main tracks for each line segment. 
To determine the capacity of a given segment, 
the network was divided into four categories, 
by current type of signal control (Armstrong, 
1979):
• “Dark” (unsignaled)
• Automatic block signals (ABS)
• Centralized traffi c control (CTC)
• Double Track CTC
About half the 99,000 route miles of Class 
I track is dark, with trains dispatched by voice 
radio. ABS track typically also uses voice radio, 
with the signals providing protection against 
following trains. CTC is the current state of the 
art in train control, although fi rst deployed in 
1927 (The Unoffi cial Toledo & Ohio Central 
Home Page, 2004).  In CTC territory, trains 
move on signal indication, and double track 
CTC permits movement on either track in either 
direction under signal control.
ZETA-TECH previously calculated a 
practical maximum line capacity for each of 
these types of signal systems Resor, Smith and 
Patel, 1997).  This was done by using data on 
type of signal control, operating speed, number 
of trains, and frequency and severity of train 
delays to construct a scalar number called 
dispatching effectiveness for each of a number 
of line segments.  The study used actual train 
movement data and minimum train running times 
(developed through use of computer simulation) 
for 33 Class I line segments to develop statistical 
estimates of the effectiveness of operation of 
railroad line. Dispatching effectiveness could 
range from 0.0 to 1.0; in practice, the lowest 
effectiveness was about 0.35, the highest about 
0.8.  Examination of the results of the analysis 
of the 33 line segments allowed conclusions 
to be drawn regarding the traffic levels at 
which specific segments were beyond their 
practical capacity.  From these observations, 
the thresholds in Table 1 were developed. 
Specifi c segments where traffi c exceeded these 
thresholds for current signal systems were then 
identifi ed using the Volpe model, and a total 
mileage for the segments in each category was 
calculated.  To estimate the cost of increasing 
capacity, a set of rules was developed for adding 
line capacity in the most cost-effective manner. 
If traffi c on a dark segment exceeded capacity, 
the most effective remedy was the addition of 
block signals.  On ABS lines, the signals were 
upgraded to CTC.  On CTC lines, a second track 
was added. On double-track CTC, a third main 
track was added.
It must be emphasized that the track mileage 
in Table 1 is on lines already operating at or 
above capacity.  These lines are experiencing 
poor performance, which causes train delays and 
loss of equipment productivity.   Installation of 
PTC will provide an immediate benefi t.  While 
it is true that additional capacity may be required 
later as traffi c grows, installation of PTC will 
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resolve operating diffi culties that already exist. 
The benefi t is thus the potential for PTC to 
permit railroads to defer expenditures they would 
otherwise have to make to expand capacity.
Cost of Increasing Capacity. Railroads can 
increase network capacity either by improving 
the signal system or by adding track.  Control 
system enhancements are certainly less costly 
than adding track.  An industry signal expert 
provided rough estimates of the cost of upgrading 
signal systems shown in the last column of Table 
2.9  Obviously, a railroad will select the least 
costly alternative for increasing capacity.  In dark 
and ABS territory, this will mean adding ABS 
or CTC (at the appropriate cost per mile).  For 
single- or double-track CTC, the signal system is 
already state of the art.  The only way to increase 
capacity further, without use of some new control 
technology (such as PTC), is to add additional 
main track.  Construction cost for new track is 
about $1,000,000 per mile, plus $15,000 per 
mile for signals.  
Of course, PTC also offers a capacity 
increase, and is certainly less costly than 
additional main track.  However, absent the 
installation of PTC, railroads will have no option 
but to add main tracks as traffi c continues to 
increase.  Table 2 shows the total one-time 
capital cost of adding this track.  
A more useful number might be the annual-
ized cost of these 8,394 miles of track.  There are 
two components to this cost: the annualized cost 
of the track construction, fi gured at $1,015,000 
per mile, and the annual cost to maintain the 
track. The annualized construction cost is based 
Table 1: Criteria for Capacity Improvements












15 MGT 8,697 Install ABS $125,000 
ABS territory 35 MGT 1,789 Install CTC $65,000 
CTC single track 75 MGT 4,452 Add double track $1,015,000
CTC double track 150 MGT 3,942 Add additional track $1,015,000
NOTE:  CTC capacity enhancement reflects cost of additional track at $1 million per mile plus cost 
of CTC signaling on new track at $15,000 per mile.


















Single-Track CTC      4,452 Track $1,000,000 $15,000 $4,519
Double-Track CTC      3,942 Track $1,000,000 $15,000 $4,001
Total 8,394 Total $8,520
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Single-Track CTC 4,452 $317.7 $269.4 $587.1
Double-Track CTC 3,942 $281.3 $238.6 $519.9
Total 8,394 $599.0 $508.0 $1,107.0
on a life of 80 years10 and a discount rate of 
7%.  The annual maintenance cost is based 
on the industry average spending per track 
mile for capital investment plus maintenance 
of way operating expenses (such things as 
track inspection, snow removal, and minor 
maintenance) for all track owned by Class I 
railroads.  Applying these numbers to the 8,394 
miles of track produces the totals shown in 
Table 3.
It is important to note that the costs in Table 
3 are for addressing current, not future, capacity 
constraints.  In the absence of an industry 
decision to install PTC, even more investment 
will be required if traffi c continues to increase. 
Projections by the American Association of State 
Highway and Transportation Offi cials predict a 
57% increase in freight movement by 2020 
(American Association of State Highway and 
Transportation Offi cials, 2003).  If this increase 
in demand occurs, then the additional 8,000 miles 
of track discussed here would be inadequate and 
even more investment to accommodate additional 
demand would be required.  Investment in PTC 
would, however, permanently forestall the need 
for 8,000 additional track-miles of capacity.
Equipment Utilization
According to a study on dispatching effectiveness 
in railroading, signifi cant reductions in travel 
time are available when there is a greater 
availability of real-time or near real-time 
information for railroad dispatchers (Resor, 
Smith and Patel, 1997).  Analysis showed that a 
travel time reduction of 2.3% could be achieved 
if dispatchers received train position information 
every 3.5 minutes, as would be expected under 
PTC, rather than every 17 minutes, as would be 
expected under a classic CTC system.  
Railroad business case analyses 
conducted in the early 1990s identifi ed very 
significant line capacity increases available 
from implementation of PTC.  These capacity 
increases were achieved by use of sophis ticated 
meet/pass planning algorithms, combined with 
the dynamic headways made possible by the 
PTC train control technology.  In Burlington 
Northern’s analysis, a meet/pass planning model 
developed at the University of Pennsylvania was 
applied to actual train movement data on 16 BN 
line segments (Resor and Smith, 1989).  In all 
cases, use of the dispatching model produced 
substantial improvements in running time. 
Improvements ranged from less than 10% for 
high-priority (intermodal) trains to as much as 
35% for low-priority coal and grain trains on 
some lanes. 
In the present analysis, more modest 
improvements have been assumed.  For 
intermodal trains (which already enjoy 
preferential dispatching treatment) a reduction 
of only 5% to 10% in running times has been 
estimated after accounting for a non-line-haul 
percentage of 52%, the dock-to-dock reduction 
in time becomes 2.5% to 5%.  For carload freight 
service, where cars must pass through multiple 
yards, some of the reduction in over-the-road 
running time will be lost during yard visits, 
producing only a modest 2.5% to 8.5% reduction 
in dock-to-dock average time.
For bulk commodity movements (coal 
and grain) the potential benefi t appears much 
larger, since these trains are not generally yarded 
between origin and destination.  A reduction of 
between 6% and 15% in terminal-to-terminal 
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time has been estimated, based on the BN 
analysis and some more recent work.
Table 4 quantifi es the benefi ts of precision 
dispatching in terms of equipment ownership 
savings.  In each case, the running time 
improvement identifi ed in the analysis has been 
discounted by the percentage of time a car is 
actually moving (which varies between 52% and 
59% depending on type of traffi c).
Some administrative benefits might be 
realized, in terms of improved and simplifi ed 
timekeeping and recording of such items as 
initial and fi nal terminal delay, but these benefi ts 
have not been quantifi ed here since they will be 
location-specifi c and cannot easily be estimated 
for the entire Class I railroad network.
Impact of Yards. What about the yards?  Is it 
not the case that any gain in line-haul running 
times will simply be lost in additional time to 
traverse the yard?  While it is true that time 
required to switch trains is a very signifi cant 
part of the travel time of any railroad car, it is 
most emphatically not the case that gains in the 
line-haul would simply be erased in the yards.  In 
fact, more predictable running time for the line 
haul will make yard operations easier, because 
yard employees will have better information 
on the expected arrival times of trains and can 
thus plan operations more effectively. This may 
lead to reduced time in yards. This is amply 
demonstrated in the literature (Martland and 
Smith, 1989). 
Work Order Reporting
The purpose of the work order system is to plan 
and schedule the work of train crews.  However, 
it is not possible to schedule all work in advance, 
because it is impossible to perfectly predict 
future occurrences.  However, the addition of 
unplanned work may mean delays to cars or 
train crews, since without advance knowledge 
of work to be done, crews may run out of time 
before completing all scheduled work and any 
additional work.11  Outbound connections in 
yards may also be missed if large volumes of 
































































































































Real-time or near real-time information 
will reduce additional, unplanned work by 
reducing the volume of inaccurate or out-of-
date information used in the generation of work 
orders. Because yard and industry switchers and 
local freights perform most additional work, the 
benefi ts resulting from a reduction in additional 
work will be realized mostly in these services. 
For this reason, the analysis presented here is 
confi ned to switchers and local freights. 
Real-time transmission of train crew work 
instructions and reports of work completed may 
be expected to produce the following benefi ts:
1. A 5% improvement in inbound schedule 
adherence for all carload freight, based on 
an estimated 4.5% reduction in average yard 
time.
2. More timely response to customer “pull” 
requests (not quantifi ed in this analysis due 
to a lack of specifi c data)
3. A reduction of one day’s transit time for 
7.5% of carload freight outbound from 
shipper to yard, due to ability to pre-block 
cars on local freight trains for onward 
connections.
4. A reduction of the same percentage (7.5%) 
in cars handled in yards.  This benefi t has 
not been quantifi ed in this analysis because 
yards have not been explicitly modeled.
The benefits of real-time work order 
reporting apply only to carload freight traffi c.  
A detailed description of the methodology 
used to develop the benefi ts estimates shown in 
Table 5 may be found in an earlier study (Resor, 
Smith, and Patel, 1992).
Locomotive Diagnostics 
Locomotive diagnostics are sensors that monitor 
critical locomotive components (air intakes, fuel 
injectors, electrical system) and provide warnings 
to train crews and/or mechanical maintenance 
employees when components are close to failure. 
Most modern diesel locomotives are equipped 
by manufacturers with diagnostic systems 
of varying complexity and sophistication. 
Therefore, the central question in this part of 
the analysis is whether real-time transmission of 
this diagnostic information to a central location 
adds signifi cant value.  The analysis presented 
here assumes the existence of a digital data link 
(installed for train control purposes), and an on-
board computer.  In this case, the incremental 
cost of locomotive monitoring with real-time 
reporting is small.    
Because of  data limitations, this analysis 
addresses only reductions in en-route failures 
(and resulting delays) and reductions in 
maintenance hours required (with a consequent 
reduction in time off line per locomotive).  An 
annual savings was generated in each of these 
areas by using available data such as annual 
expenditures for maintenance, the ownership 
cost of locomotives (a level annuity based on 
purchase price), and a cost per train delay (based 
on the ownership cost of cars and locomotives 
on a typical train).
To quantify the magnitude of potential 
benefi ts, a simulation model was developed by 
Burlington Northern to estimate the reduction 








Inbound 6,260,000 5% $12.92 $4.0
Outbound 6,260,000 7.5% $12.92 $6.1
Total Carloads 12,520,000 $10.1
Table 5: Estimated Annual Savings from Use of Real-Time Work Order Reporting
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problems. This estimate was then used in a model 
developed by Northrop Corporation to estimate 
total labor savings. To apply the Northrop 
model, fleet performance statistics (frequency 
of failures) are needed. This data was obtained 
from two Class I railroads for 2003.
It was calculated that availability of real-
time diagnostic information could save 8.3% of 
total labor in a base case in which no locomotives 
had diagnostic equipment. In fact, since 1987 
railroads have been purchasing new locomotives 
equipped with factory-installed diagnostics. 
The BN simulations indicated that on-board 
diagnostics with no real-time transmission 
capability could achieve 44% of the reduction 
in hours estimated for on-board diagnostics with 
real-time transmission of diagnostic data to the 
repair shop. This means that for those units 
already equipped with diagnostics, only 44% of 
the 8.3% savings can be taken. 
A review of locomotive purchases by major 
North American railroads for the years 1987 
– 2001 (Association of American Railroads, 
2004) indicates that 9,730 of the 2001 fleet of 
19,745 units have been purchased or rebuilt 
since 1985. Therefore the 8.3% savings in labor 
hours applies only to the 50.7% of locomotives 
in service that were built prior to 1985. For the 
remaining 49.3%, the benefi t is reduced by 44% 
* 8.3%, to a savings of 4.6%.
Total estimated benefi ts from use of real-
time locomotive diagnostics are shown in Table 
6.  The estimated savings for locomotives without 
diagnostics is $469.7 million * .507 *.083, or 
$19.8 million annually.  For locomotives with 
diagnostics, annual savings is $469.7 million * 
.493 * .038, or $8.8 million.
Fuel Savings
Previous studies by Burlington Northern 
Railroad and Canadian National Railways 
examined in detail the potential for fuel savings 
through use of Positive Train Control.  These 
savings had two sources:
• The use of an “energy management system” 
(EMS) to minimize fuel consumption within 
the constraint of a defi ned schedule by opti-
mizing each train’s velocity profi le.
• The use of a “pacing” algorithm in the com-
puter-aided dispatching system to supply 
target arrival times at meet points to trains, 
allowing them to operate at less than track 
speed where doing so would meet the arrival 
target, thereby saving fuel.
Both CN and BN developed estimates of 
fuel savings in the range of 2.5% due to pacing 
and more effi cient dispatching.  A great deal of 
effort was expended in simulations of operations 
in order to develop these numbers, and they 
represent the best available estimates of savings 
from PTC implementation (Resor, Smith, Patel 
and Kondapalli, 1990).
In the quantification of benefits, it was 
decided to use a range rather than a point 
estimate for most sources of benefi ts.  A range 
of 1.5% to 3.5% was selected for quantifying fuel 
savings.  For the entire U.S. railroad industry, 
fuel represented an annual expense of some 
$3.791 billion in 2001 (AAR, 2004).  Thus a 













20,506 50.0% 2.5 51,265 25,633 $1,350 $34.6




Total Annual Labor 










49.3% 50.7% 8.3% 3.8%
20,506 10,109 10,397 $469.7 $19.8 $8.8 $28.6
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1.5% to 3.5% savings produced a range of $57 
million to $133 million in fuel cost savings.  
SHIPPER BENEFITS
What is the value of better service?  Benefi ts to 
the shipper as a result of PTC implementation 
by railroads can be estimated by measuring the 
reduction in shippers’ logistics cost.  The most 
important of these logistics benefi ts is associated 
with the ability of railroads to provide improved 
on-time service.  Here are three methods by 
which shipper benefi ts from PTC implementa-
tion may be measured:
1. Inventory reduction cost method – Deter-
mine the savings shippers might realize 
in terms of the reduced inventory portion 
of logistics cost if service reliability im-
proves.  
2. Price elasticity method – Determine what 
additional amount shippers might be will-
ing to pay for improved service reliabil-
ity.  
3. Logistics cost elasticity method – Deter-
mine benefi ts based on the cross-elasticity 
of demand and price relative to PTC-en-
abled improvements in transit time and its 
variability.
These methods do not all measure precisely 
the same thing.  The fi rst method only investi-
gates the inventory portion of logistics cost, both 
the size of safety stock and the value of in-transit 
inventory.  The second looks at how much ship-
pers are willing to pay for better service; and 
the third gives a measure of total logistics cost 
based on theoretical studies. Because the ability 
to measure the value of improved service with 
great precision does not yet exist, these tech-
niques are merely presented as different ways 
of getting an estimate of potential benefi ts and 
assessing their size. In addition, analysis of the 
information here will assist in understanding 
where emphasis should be placed on improving 
the accuracy with which such phenomena can 
be measured.
There seems to be little question that PTC 
can improve service reliability. The issue here 
is one of quantifying the magnitude of improve-
ments. These benefi ts are fi rst quantifi ed in terms 
of potential service improvements.  These im-
provements can be inferred from a Harvard 
Business School Case Study (Harvard Business 
School, 1991) as follows:
• For improvement in percent of carload ship-
ments arriving on time: 3.5%
• For the percent improvement in travel time 
variance:  7%
The analytic steps involved in the analysis 
needed to translate these service improvements 
into dollar benefi ts may be understood through 
close examination of Table 7.  Frequent refer-
ence to this table will be made in the next few 
pages while describing the computational steps 
involved.  As the computational techniques in-
volved in these three methods are complex, the 
columns in Table 7 have been numbered.  This 
will assist in describing how each computation 
proceeds.
Method 1 – Calculating Benefi t From 
Inventory Cost Reductions
One technique for determining the benefi ts of 
improved service reliability is to look at poten-
tial changes in “safety stock,” the goods carried 
in inventory to protect against service failures. 
As the rise of “just in time” inventory systems 
indicates, a reduction in inventory is a real sav-
ing for the shipper. So rather than examining the 
effect of improved service on elements of the 
logistics chain, the effect is quantifi ed in terms 
of reduction in safety stock inventory for the 
shipper and receiver.
Every shipper must arrange to have raw 
materials, work-in-process, and fi nished goods 
at the right place at the right time. When a cus-
tomer places an order, the shipper will compete 
best if that product is available right away and 
in the right condition. Being out of stock can be 
enormously expensive. The actual transportation 
of the shipper’s goods by the carrier is only one 
element in a series of activities associated with 
the total logistics process.
Many authorities may be consulted regard-
ing the logistics costs associated with shipping 
(Cook et. al, 1999).  However, a more general 
approach is provided by Cass Information Sys-
tems. Each year, the company produces a report 
on the state of logistics in the United States (Cass 
Information Systems, Inc., 2003).  The Cass re-
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port provides, among other elements of data, 
transportation costs, inventory carrying costs, 
and administrative costs.
From the point of view of service reliability, 
the shipper’s benefi t will come from holding less 
inventory.  The more unreliable the delivery time 
of a shipment, the larger the amount of safety 
stock that must be held.  Inventory carrying costs 
consist of interest on the capital associated with 
investment in the product perishability and ob-
solescence, insurance, taxes, and storage costs. 
The total of these costs, by Cass’ estimate, would 
be about 21% of the total value of inventory for 
2002.  However, this estimate is based partly on 
an interest cost of only 1.5%.  Research on the 
long-term cost of equity capital reveals that it 
is about 6% to 7% (Reilly, 1979).  Using 6% to 
7% rather than 1.5% as a cost of capital increases 
total carrying costs to about 26% of the value of 
inventory.  
The method used in this report divided 
shipments into categories based on two-digit 
Standard Transportation Commodity Codes 
(STCCs). Columns 1 – 6 of Table 7 provide the 
tonnage and revenue information for two-digit 
STCC groups that represent over 98% of the tons 
shipped via railroad. 
Columns 3 and 5 show for each STCC group 
the total number of tons of that group that the 
railroads shipped in 2002, along with an estimate 
of the average value per ton of commodities in 
that group.  For an estimate of the value per ton 
in each of the STCC groups, this report used 
data provided in a report prepared by Reebie 
Associates for the Ohio Department of Trans-
portation (Ohio Department of Transportation, 
2002).  Because the cited report provides these 
values for 1998, this report adjusts those values 
over the intervening years using appropriate pro-
ducer price indexes from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.  
The annual value of goods shipped by rail 
is shown in column 6, which is the product of 
columns 3 and 5.  Adding up the values in col-
umn 6 shows that a total of approximately $1.6 
trillion. This amount indicates that the railroads 
are shipping about 16% of the nation’s $10 tril-
lion annual GDP. 
Column 4 of Table 7 provides the average 
revenue per ton for goods in each STCC group 
shipped in 2002. 
To determine how greater reliability will 
impact the shipper, it will be important to know 
how much inventory shippers must hold for 
each of these kinds of freight to guard against 
the variability of transportation service.  For the 
most part, shippers will wish to avoid a stockout 
situation.  To guard against stockout due to slow 
transportation, a shipper will want to maintain 
a bit of inventory.  The question is how much. 
In the case of the railroad, that inventory can be 
estimated by determining the standard deviation 
of travel time.  If the shipper wants to reduce 
the probability of a stockout because of ship-
ping failure to less than 2%, for example, then 
a safety stock of two “standard deviations” of 
days would be suffi cient.  For example, if the 
standard deviation in railroad service time were 
two days, then a stock of four days’ worth of 
product would be suffi cient.  If, on the other 
hand, the shipper wants to reduce the probabil-
ity of stockout because of shipping failure to 
less than 0.5%, then an inventory containing at 
least three standard deviations of shipping time 
would be necessary.
The fi nancial consequences of a stock-out 
can vary, and so, of course, can the value of 
avoiding one.  The fi nancial consequence of 
a stock-out will depend on the demand for the 
product, the value of it, and the cost of transport-
ing it or carrying it in inventory.  The amount of 
inventory kept by a shipper to avoid a stock-out 
will vary in a manner that depends on these fac-
tors.  A study by the FHWA makes a judgment 
as to the optimal probability of stock-out that a 
shipper should work toward based on all these 
factors (Federal Highway Administration, 2002). 
While this amount does vary, a stockout prob-
ability of 0.5% is not out of line.
To perform the analysis, each commodity 
must be assigned a freight car type.  The largest 
difference in standard deviation of travel time 
is between intermodal shipments, carload ship-
ments and unit train shipments.  STCC 46 (mis-
cellaneous mixed shipments), which is nearly 
always shipped via intermodal, and STCC 37 
(transportation equipment), which receives inter-
modal-like service, are classifi ed as intermodal. 
Unit trains are generally used to transport STCCs 
10, 11, and 14.  All other commodities are con-





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































It is now possible to calculate the value 
of the inventory that is held to guard against 
variations in rail transit time.  This calculation 
appears in columns 7 – 10 of Table 7.  For 
details as to how the computation proceeds in 
each case, consider the computation for Farm 
Products (STCC 10).  As shown in column 
6, the railroads shipped $143,746 million of 
STCC 10 in 2002. To avoid potential stock out 
because of the lack of reliability in rail transit 
times, the shipper must hold 8.27 days worth 
of safety stock (column 7 - based on the rail 
standard deviation of 2.62 days).  The value of 
this safety stock is calculated from the total value 
of product shipped each day (column 6 divided 
by 365 – daily shipment value) multiplied by 
8.27 (column 7) to produce the value of required 
safety stock, as shown in column 8.  The savings 
to the shipper is a savings in the carrying cost of 
this inventory, or the safety stock multiplied by 
26%. This number ($846.8 million), not shown 
in the table, is then multiplied by the percent 
reduction in standard deviation (column 9) to 
yield the inventory benefit that is shown in 
column 10 or $59 million.  The total annual 
benefi t for all commodities is $442 million.
Mean and variance of railroad transit times 
were found in a very thorough study of the 
Waybill Sample for 1991 (Kwon, et. al.1995). 
Table 8 summarizes the fi ndings of this study. 
From this information, it is possible to develop 
the amounts of safety stock that shippers will 
need to guard against stockouts caused by 
transportation failure.  Figures in Table 8 are 
based on a stockout probability of 0.5%.
There will be one exception to that approach. 
The only commodity that is not used in any 
further processing or that does not need to be 
sold afterward is waste and scrap. There will 
be no inventory savings estimate made for that 
commodity.
Method 2 – Calculating Benefi ts Based on 
Elasticity of Demand
A second method for calculating the savings from 
improved rail service is the ‘stated preference’ 
method.  Unlike a revealed preference analysis, 
which involves a study of actions actually taken 
by shippers in response to changing price and 
service levels, a stated preference method can 
achieve similar results using a survey.
In 1989, the Burlington Northern Railroad 
(BN), predecessor to Burlington Northern and 
Santa Fe Railway (BNSF), completed such 
a study to determine the revenue potentially 
available from service improvements resulting 
from adoption of the Advanced Railroad 
Electronics System (ARES).12  The results of 
the study were developed into two case studies 
by Harvard Business School on the potential 
for ARES (Harvard Business School, 1991). 
The study looked exclusively at shipment of 
truck-competitive commodities.  The railroad’s 
question was: what levels of service improvement 
would cause the shipper to consider switching 
from truck to rail?
The survey instrument used in the BNSF 
study was based on a defi nition of reliability 
that is a bit different from the one used in the 
inventory method and logistics method for 
calculating this benefi t.  For the BNSF study, 
reliability was defi ned as the proportion of time 
that a shipment arrived when the shipper wanted 
it to arrive.  This defi nition is consistent with the 
way that a shipper sees reliability.  A relationship 
between this reliability measure and standard 
deviation will be discussed later.
Table 8:  Mean and Standard Deviation of Railroad Transit Times
Equipment/Service Type
Average Travel Time 
(Days)
Standard Deviation of Travel Time 
(Days)
Boxcar 7.19 2.62
Unit Hopper Car 5.25 2.04
Double-stack Container Car 2.53 0.5
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The results of the survey indicated that for 
1% increase in transit time reliability, the railroad 
could expect a revenue increase of 4%.  This is 
a very large number. This result implies that if 
the railroad can improve its on-time service by 
just two or three percentage points (that is, about 
3% to 4% better than it is now), the incremental 
revenue could be as much as 12% to 16% (when 
keeping the quantity shipped constant).  While 
these gains would apply only to carload freight, 
the service elasticity still seemed quite high.
It is for this reason that executives at the 
Burlington Northern were highly skeptical of 
the price/service elasticity estimates developed 
from the survey.  As reported in the Harvard 
Business School Case Study, BNSF managers’ 
own estimates of price elasticity with respect to 
service ranged from zero to 0.4.  In response to 
the need to move forward with a study on ARES, 
they compromised on a value of 2.0.  The pool of 
available benefi ts using this compromise value 
for elasticity is used for computation in Table 
7.
The calculation of benefits using this 
technique proceeds in columns 11 – 15 in Table 
7.  A description of the calculation procedure 
for farm products follows.  Column 11 indicates 
that farm products receive carload style service. 
Column 12 shows the cross elasticity of price 
with respect to on-time service, which for 
carload-style service is 2.0.  Column 13 shows 
the increase in on-time performance capability 
that PTC can generate, which is reported in 
the Harvard Business School Case Study as 
3.5%. Multiplying this service improvement 
by the elasticity number indicates that a price 
improvement of 7% can be expected.  This 
price improvement is then multiplied by the 
revenue generated by farm products (column 
4) to produce the estimated increase in railroad 
revenue shown in column 15, $190 million (0.07 
* $2,711 million).
The total annual shippers’ benefi t from PTC, 
using this calculation method, is $1.3 billion.
Method 3 – Logistics Analysis
A check on the value of service is available from 
a draft government document on the effect of 
freight on the U.S. economy (Federal Highway 
Administration, 2002).  That draft document 
contains a chart showing the elasticity of 
transportation demand with respect to price as 
well as the elasticity with respect to “transit time 
and transit time variability.”  The latter elasticity 
does not distinguish between transit time and 
its variance.  Because evidence exists that 
customers are more concerned about transit time 
variance than about transit time itself, use of this 
elasticity would be conservative in the sense that 
actual elasticity is likely to be larger (Harvard 
Business School, 1991).  Further, the study 
focuses primarily on motor carrier transportation, 
which is already reliable to an extreme degree; 
therefore, variability in reliability itself may 
not be suffi cient to observe the sensitivity to 
reliability that customers actually show.
The report indicates that elasticity of 
demand with respect to own price is -0.97 and 
that elasticity of demand with respect to transit 
time and its variability is -0.52.  Combining these 
yields a cross elasticity of -0.54, which will be 
used to determine the price gain available from 
improved service.
As reported earlier, a reduction of 7% 
can be expected in transit time with PTC-style 
improvements.  Applying a cross-elasticity of 
-0.54 to the entire $36 billion annual railroad 
market yields an increase of $1.4 billion annually 
in price for a 7% transit time and variability 
improvement.  When applied to carload freight 
only, the price improvement would be limited to 
$700 million annually (because carload freight 
accounts for about half of railroad revenue).
Total Annual Shipper Benefi ts
In addition to benefi ting from improved service, 
shippers will have the added advantage of lower 
cost transportation through an increased use of 
lower-priced rail service.  Rather than calculate 
that amount here, we elect to round the result 
in Table 7 upward, yielding a maximum annual 
benefi t of approximately $1.4 billion (Method 2). 
As a low estimate, we select a number between 
the inventory gain of approximately $400 million 
annually and the high estimate of $1.4 billion 
annually, that is, $900 million.
As mentioned earlier, the shipper category 
of benefi ts has generated more controversy than 
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any other.  There are at least two reasons for 
this:
1. The benefi t, if it exists, is very diffi cult to 
measure.
2. The benefi t may not accrue to the railroad.
Each is discussed in turn.
Measurement diffi culties are apparent in all 
three of the methods used here.  The inventory 
method is easiest to understand.  However, it is 
well known that there are many other elements of 
logistics cost, for example the cost of a shipper’s 
production apparatus based on whether JIT logis-
tics is workable.  The third method of measuring 
benefi ts considers all the elements of logistics 
cost; however, it is exceptionally complicated 
and can suffer from problems associated with 
excessive aggregation.  Finally, the second 
method (elasticity) has the virtue of simplicity 
because it is based on asking shippers, “How 
much would you pay?”  But it suffers from the 
problems associated with too much aggregation 
and too little understanding of the causes for the 
amounts that shippers say they would pay.  
Even if consensus can be reached as to the 
best way to measure how the system would react 
in an economic sense to changes in service, there 
would still be considerable consternation over 
how to measure service itself.  For example, rail 
carload service is measured in terms of plus or 
minus one day, while motor carrier service is 
measured in plus or minus two-hour windows. 
Will an improvement in service merely raise 
the bar of expectations as opposed to changing 
economic behavior?
In addition to trouble posed by the diffi culty 
of measuring shipper benefi ts is the concern over 
whether these benefi ts can be reaped by the rail-
roads themselves.  And there is ample evidence 
that this may not be the case at all.  Since deregu-
lation in 1980, railroad costs have plummeted.  A 
recent study (Martland, 1998) indicates that the 
railroads have simply given about 80% of that 
benefi t to the shipper.
This paper presents information gathered as 
the result of a contract with the Federal Railroad 
Administration.  As an agency of the govern-
ment, the FRA is not concerned whether any 
identifi ed benefi t would accrue to a particular 
party, only that the benefi t exists.
COSTS OF POSITIVE TRAIN CONTROL
The following tables recap the cost of each of 
the three segments (vehicle, wayside, central of-
fi ce) of PTC.   Costs are for equipping the entire 
Class I network and all locomotives.  Costs have 
been obtained from manufacturers and railroads. 
They are expressed as ranges, because there re-
mains some uncertainty over what the price of 
each component might be in an industry-wide 
deployment.
The FRA study defi ned two types of PTC; 
“PTC A,” an overlay system, and “PTC B,” a 
fully functional system incorporating dynamic 
block capability. Costs here are for the more 
expensive PTC B.
The central offi ce cost remains the greatest 
unknown. Because much of the work to write 
Table 9: Cost per Segment, PTCB (2001 dollars)
Segment Unit Estimated Cost Per Unit
Low High
Vehicle Each $30,000 $75,000
Wayside Track Mile $16,000 $24,000
Central Offi ce Each $100 million $500 million
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vital code has been done as part of the Illinois 
project, and could presumably be modifi ed at 
relatively low cost for use in other installations, 
the “low” cost is probably most appropriate for 
any single railroad.  However, it is doubtful that 
railroads will choose to share control centers, so 
the total cost for all seven Class I railroads could 
conceivably approach the “high” cost.
Total estimated cost is shown in Table 10.
These costs may be overstated, because 
some investments in PTC-compatible equipment 
have already been made. Union Pacifi c Railroad 
reports that 2,600 of its 6,847 locomotives, or 
38%, are equipped with ATCS radios.  About 
25% of UP route miles (9,600 route miles) are 
covered by ATCS UHF repeaters.
BNSF reports that about 1,900 route miles 
are covered by ATCS-type radio, used for switch 
and signal control. CSX Transportation has about 
3,000 route miles of radio coverage, also used 
for switch and signal control.  Whether this 
equipment might need to be replaced or upgraded 
to be compatible with a full PTC installation is 
not known at this time.
Note that the costs in Table 10 are capital 
costs only.  In addition to these costs, an annual 
charge equal to 15% of the total capital cost of 
PTC would be added to operating expenses once 
PTC is fully implemented.  This charge, set at 
a typical level for the electronics industry, is 
intended to cover training, maintenance, and 
technological obsolescence.13
SUMMARY OF BENEFITS AND COST/
BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Summary of Benefi ts
Table 11 provides a summary of benefi ts for 
PTC.  Most of the benefi ts quantifi ed in Table 
11 are savings to the railroads from more 
effi cient operation.  In the case of line capacity, 
the annual amounts shown are an annualization 
of the capital cost of 8,300 miles of second main 
track plus the annual cost of maintaining that 
track.  Car and locomotive savings are similarly 
calculated.  In each case, an annual ownership 
cost is calculated using a purchase price, an 
expected service life, and a cost of money.
The only benefi ts that are not direct savings 
to railroads are the shipper benefi ts, which are 
composed of savings shippers might realize in 
total logistics cost if railroad service improved 
and rates did not increase.
It is important to note that it is by no means 
certain that railroads will realize all of the 
savings in Table 11.  Railroads might choose to 
give some of the savings to their customers in the 
form of lower rail rates; historically, 80% of the 
savings railroads have realized since deregulation 
have been given to shippers (Martland, 1998). 
But whether the benefi ts flow to railroads or to 
their customers, in one way or another the entire 
U.S. economy benefi ts.
Table 10: Total Estimated Cost, PTC B, Class I Railroad Network  (2001 dollars)
Segment PTC B Low PTC B High System Cost (millions)
Low High
Locomotives 20,506 $30,000 $75,000 $615.2 $1,538.0
Route Miles 99,250 $16,000 $24,000 $1,588.0 $2,382.0
Central Offi ce $100.0 $500.0
Total PTC cost $2,303.2 $4,420.0
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Table 11: Summary of Estimated Annual PTC Benefi ts (all costs in 2001 dollars)
BENEFIT AREA Low High
Line Capacity Avoided Investment $299.5 $422.0
Avoided Maintenance $508.0 $762.0
Precision Dispatch Car Ownership $322.1 $868.2
Locomotive Ownership $85.9 $171.9
Work Order Report Car Ownership $10.1 $10.1
Locomotive Diagnostics Locomotive Maintenance $28.6 $28.6
Locomotive Road Failure $34.6 $34.6
Fuel $55.9 $130.5
Shipper Benefi ts $900.0 $1,400.0
Total Estimated Annual Benefi ts $2,244.7 $3,827.9








Costs, Cash Flows, and IRR Calculations
Table 12 displays estimates of the cost of 
PTC.  These are the total one-time costs of 
implementing the three segments of PTC: 
wayside, on-board, and central offi ce.  Because 
of uncertainties, a range is given.
Of course PTC cannot be deployed all at 
once, and there will be maintenance and training 
costs as well.  Therefore, a cash flow analysis for 
an investment in both PTC A and PTC B has been 
carried out using the following assumptions:
• A five-year installation period for the 
wayside component of PTC, with 20% of 
Class I mileage equipped each year
• A fi ve-year installation period for the vehicle 
component
• A fi ve-year installation and testing period for 
the central offi ce hardware and software
• A benefi ts phase-in over a fi ve-year period 
lagging the installation by one year
• Beginning in Year 6, a charge of 15% of the 
total installation cost per year is made for 
training, maintenance, and obsolescence14
• A 7% cost of money
• A 20-year benefi ts period
A calculation of internal rate of return (IRR) 
and cash flow is shown in Table 13, for four 
scenarios:
• Low cost, high benefi ts
• High cost, high benefi ts
• Low cost, low benefi ts
• High cost, low benefi ts
To make the IRR calculations, a table of 
cash flows was prepared, showing net cash flows 
per year, positive and negative, during the life of 
the proposed investment.  In all cases, the period 
of negative cash flow is fi ve years or less, and 
94
Positive Train Control
in some cases is less than two years. Cash flow 
then becomes positive, and stays positive, for 
the remaining life of the investment. This occurs 
despite the 15% annual charge for training, 
maintenance, and obsolescence.
CONCLUSION
PTC is a large investment by any measure.  A 
cost of $2.3 billion to $4.4 billion might seem 
daunting to an industry with gross revenues 
of only $35 billion.  However, the projected 
annual benefi ts of $2.2 billion to $3.8 billion 
provides a rapid payback period.  It should be 
noted that the value of accident avoidance (the 
near elimination of human factors accidents) has 
not been included in either benefi t calculation, 
but is being calculated separately by the Federal 
Railroad Administration.
Clearly, PTC offers an opportunity to U.S. 
freight railroads.  Implementation of such a 
system would:
• Improve service reliability for shippers, 
producing a large benefi t for them
• Increase the capacity of about 8,000 route 
miles that are now at or above capacity, 
enabling railroads to avoid a very substantial 
near-term investment in track and signals
• Produce immediate savings in car and 
locomotive ownership cost through 
improved utilization
Railroads have been reluctant to invest in 
this new technology, in part because of capital 
constraints, in part because of uncertainty 
about the benefi ts, and in part through a fear 
of government action to require the investment 
on a safety basis.  However, PTC does appear 
to provide significant business benefits to 
the freight railroads, as well as unquestioned 
safety benefi ts through positive enforcement 
of movement authorities.  There remains 
uncertainty regarding the percentage of benefi ts 
railroads might actually realize, as opposed to 
shippers (in the form of lower rates).  Given 
that there is a stated public policy objective of 
putting more freight on railroads, possibly there 
might be some consideration of public fi nancing 
because the results of this analysis suggest that 
the benefi t to the U.S. economy as a whole 
(whichever stakeholder received benefi ts) could 
be substantial.
Table 13: Calculated Internal Rates of Return, PTC Four   
Analysis Cases
Low Benefi ts High Benefi ts
Low Costs 95% 160%




1.  The Surface Transportation Board classifi es railroads as “Class 1” if they exceed an annual revenue 
threshold -- $277.7 million in 2003.  In that year, there were seven Class 1 railroads, 32 regional 
railroads (revenues of at least $40 million annually but less than the Class I threshold) and 510 local 
railroads with less than $40 million in annual revenues.
2.  Movement authorities defi ne the distance a train may safely proceed along a railroad track before 
encountering another train or some other condition, such as a track switch not lined properly, that 
prevents further movement.
3.  RSAC is a working group composed of representatives from railroads, rail labor, rail industry 
suppliers, and FRA.  Its purpose is to develop safety regulations for the rail industry by reaching a 
consensus among the various stakeholders.
4.  “Vitality” is a term used by railroad signal engineers to describe a system that is “fail safe.” 
“Fail safe” means that any failures will place the system in a safer, rather than a less safe, state.  For 
example, a dark signal (due perhaps to a burned out bulb or power supply failure) must be assumed 
to be displaying its most restrictive indication.
5.  The Global Positioning System (GPS) provides the capability to locate an object in three-
dimensional space anywhere on or above the Earth’s surface, using signals transmitted by satellites 
in geostationary orbit.  Differential GPS improves accuracy by using a ground-based transmitter at 
a known location to correct inaccuracies in the satellite signals.
6.  Conventional signal systems rely on geographic blocks of fi xed length.  The length of these blocks 
must always be suffi cient to allow the longest and heaviest train to stop safely. Further, because the 
blocks are of fi xed length, time separation between trains lengthens when trains travel at less than 
“track speed” (maximum allowed speed).  Both of these factors reduce capacity, because both distance 
and time separation between trains can be longer than the minimum necessary to ensure safety.
7.  A meet occurs when two trains are traveling toward each other in opposite directions.  When the 
physical plant consists of single track with sidings, one of the trains must pull into a siding while the 
other proceeds along the main track until it meets and then passes the one in the siding.
8.  For safety reasons, a train must remain far enough behind the one ahead of it to be able to stop 
before a collision would occur.  CTC systems work by having signals at the side of the track; as a 
result, such headways must be “fi xed” in length, with that length being constrained by the spacing 
of the signals.  When dynamic positioning information of the trains themselves is available, these 
headways can be varied, that is, made dynamic, based on the available position information.
9.  It is diffi cult to estimate costs precisely, because they depend on the number of controlled turnouts, 
the number of sidings, the availability of commercial power, etc.  The numbers cited here are used 
for general budgetary purposes.
10.  The American Railway Engineering and Maintenance Association (AREMA) sets engineering 
standards for railroads;  80 years is the recommended design life for bridges and similar structures.
11.  Once a crew has worked 12 continuous on-duty hours, by Federal law they must stop work.
12.  ARES was the fi rst PTC-type control system tested by a Class I railroad.
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13.  BN used a 10% additive to cover training, maintenance, and capital replacements for its ARES 
project.  The 15% is a typical number used for electronics and other products that quickly become 
obsolete.
14.  The 15% fi gure is used in the electronics industry.  BN, in its business case for ARES, used a 
fi gure of 10% to cover training, maintenance, and replacement of parts.  A typical number for less 
sophisticated equipment (such as rail/highway crossings) is 5%.
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